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HOLLY R. CASHMAN 
COINTELPRO. COINTELPRO is the acronym for a do-
mestic counterintelligence program operated from 1956 to 
1971 by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and co-
ordinated by the Domestic Intelligence Division. This pro-
gram was initially devised to disrupt and neutralize the 
Communist Party of the United States through an aggres-
sive campaign of covert operations. Beginning in the mid-
1960s the FBI director, J. Edgar Hoovc1~ expanded the 
scope of COINTELPRO to "counteract domestic terrorism 
and conduct investigations of individuals and organiza-
tions who threatened terroristic violence" (Federal Bureau 
of Investigation). The FBI justified the deployment ol the 
draconian COINTELPRO operations to prevent Commu-
nist infiltration of "legal mass organizations" but primarilY 
of domestic groups that dissented from government policY. 
COINTELPRO employed illegal and legal covert measures 
to "neutralize" and destroy organizations that the FBI iden-
tified as a threat to national security. A Senate committee 
that investigated COINTELPRO reached a radically differ-
ent conclusion regarding the targets and tactics of the FBI. 
The committee found that "covert action programs have 
been used to disrupt the lawful political activities of indi-
vidual Americans and groups and to discredit them, using 
dangerous and degrading tactics which are abhorrent in a 
free and decent society" (U.S. Senate). Over two thousand 
known COINTELPRO operations were launched against 
Communists and an array of domestic political organiza-
tions and social movements created and led by African 
Americans, Native Americans, and Latinas and Latinos. A 
small number of these operations were launched against 
white supremacists (primarily the Ku Klux Klan). The FBI 
unilaterally determined whether any domestic political or-
ganizations posed a threat to national security and if so 
whether to authorize COINTELPRO operations. 
COINTELPRO, the FBI, and the Chicano/a Movement 
The black liberation movement, the Puerto Rican inde-
pendence movement, and the American Indian Move-
ment (AIM) were singled out for particularly aggressive 
intrusion. The FBI records that have been released do not 
indicate the extent to which official COINTELPRO opera-
tions were deployed against Chicano and Chicana organ-
izations. Yet the history of the most prominent and 
militant groups of the Chicano/a movement of the 1960s 
and 1970s is marked by a svstematic campaign of intimi-
dation and disruption by FBI operatives. In fact the vast 
majority of if not all prominent Chicano and Chicana civil 
rights and political organizations were subject to FBI sur-
veillance. COINTELPRO operations were directed prima-
rily against those organizations that advocated militant 
cultural nationalism and national liberation. All the Chi-
cano/a associations targeted by the FBI were legitimate 
political organizations. Some were committed to social-
justice goals through community-building campaigns, 
others to anti-Vietnam War activities, and others to non-
electoral paramilitary but legal political protest to affect 
public policy. The Chicano/a groups targeted by the FBI 
included but were not limited to La Raza Unida Party, 
Centro de Acci6n Social Aut6noma, the Brown Berets, the 
Crusade for Social Justice, the Chicano National Morato-
rium, and the United Farm Workers (UFW). The FBI 
identified some of these legitimate organizations as po-
tential threats to national security and applied the dra-
conian, unconstitutional methods it used in its domestic 
counterinsurgency operations against the Communists. 
One of the earliest targets of particularly aggressive 
COINTELPRO and police disruption was the Colorado-
based Crusade for Social Justice, founded by Rodolfo 
"Corky" Gonzales, a charismatic and unusually effective po-
litical leader. According to Ernesto Vigil, one of the organi-
zation's leaders and its chronicler, the crusade's "rejection of 
mainstream politics ... opened the way for a strategy of 
militant grassroots organizing and independent political ac-
tion in which Chicanos would decide their destiny inde-
pendent of institutions controlled by others" (Vigil, p. 26). 
The FBI became alarmed at the crusade's increasingly suc-
cessful organizing efforts and its growing notoriety as an ef-
fective Chicano/a liberation movement as well as at 
indications that it was assuming a national leadership role 
as a dissident organization. The FBI was ever-vigilant about 
the crusade's international connections to Mexican radical 
and Communist organizations and to domestic dissident 
groups, especially AIM. In order to discredit the crusade, the 
FBI tried to link it to Fuerzas Armadas de Liberaci6n Na-
cional (FALN), the clandestine Puerto Rican revolutionary 
organization that was responsible for a series of bombings. 
The FBI organized a disinformation campaign that spread 
rumors that the crusade and AIM had acquired weapons 
and conspired to usc them to "kill a cop a day." Attorneys 
who sought to quash subpoenas served on two crusade 
members to appear before a federal grand jury investigating 
FALN argued that the FBI had a "documented history ... to 
generally dissipate and discredit efforts of minority groups 
and civil rights organizations as part of their COINTELPRO 
program" and that the FBI had "practiced this program 
against the Crusade for Justice" (Vigil, p. 354). The crusade 
was infiltrated by FBI operatives and subjected to a relent-
less campaign of intimidation, which included fabricated 
charges and the misuse of the judicial process to obtain con-
victions of the organization's leadership, including Corky 
Gonzales. The destruction of the crusade's facilities and con-
tinuing legal battles depleted the organization's resources. 
FBI-perpetrated factionalism and incarceration of its lead-
ership demoralized and ultimately undermined the crusade. 
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The Brown Berets organization (originally the Young 
Chicanos for Community Action) was a nonstudent youth 
organization at the center of the Chicano/a movement. The 
paramilitary Brown Berets were established in 196 7 and 
like the Black Panthers formulated a radical nationalist cul-
tural perspective. The Berets called for Chicano and Chi-
cana self-reliance and militant opposition to the public 
authorities that were the source of Chicano and Chicana 
poverty and oppression. Brown Berets chapters were estab-
lished nationally, and the organization was pivotal in estab-
lishing the National Chicano Moratorium Committee, 
which organized marches and activities against the Viet-
nam War. Its history was marked by confrontation with po-
lice authorities and the deaths, injuries, and incarceration 
of many of its members. FBI agents infiltrated many of the 
local Brown Beret chapters and fomented factionalism and 
internal discord, which debilitated the organization. In 
1972 David Sanchez, the founder and leader of the Brown 
Berets, announced the dissolution of the movement (which 
claimed a membership of five thousand in ninety chapters). 
He faulted the government for "police harassment and in-
filtration, internal squabbles ... which ruined discipline" 
and could lead to bloodshed (Chavez, p. 57). 
Chicano and Chicana organizations that did not adopt 
militant cultural nationalism and avoided confrontation 
with public authorities were not immune from FBI sur-
veillance and disruption. La Raza Unida Party (RUP) was 
another important Chicano and Chicana political organi-
zation victimized by FBI counterinsurgency operations, 
including infiltration, harassment, burglaries, and so on. 
RUP was a legitimate political party that promoted Chi-
cano and Chicana cultural pride and was highly critical of 
conservative Mexican American organizations (such as 
the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) 
and the American G.I. Forum). Although it rejected the 
relevance of the existing two-party system, RUP was the 
first ethnic-based political party that fielded candidates 
for elective office. From the organization's inception in 
1970 through its demise in 1981, RUP's leadership was 
closely monitored by the FBI. 
The Centro de Acci6n Social Aut6noma ( CASA) was 
founded by the community activists Bert Corona and 
Soledad Alatorre in Los Angeles as "a voluntary, demo-
cratic mutual assistance social welfare organization" to 
provide service to undocumented Mexican workers 
(Gutierrez, p. 190). By 1975, with a membership in the 
thousands, it adopted a Marxist-Leninist philosophy and 
called for international labor unity among the Chicano 
and Chicana working class and workers in Mexico to or-
ganize against multinational corporations. The corpora-
tions, CASA told its followers, were responsible for the 
impoverishment of Latina and Latino workers throughout 
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the hemisphere. The FBI viewed CASA with increased 
concern, given its growing membership, militant interna-
tionalism, and radical critique of capitalism. CASA was in-
filtrated on the grounds that its activities could violate 
federal statutes prohibiting seditious conspiracy and ad-
vocating the overthrow of the government. 
COINTELPRO also initiated illegal infiltration and sur-
veillance of the United Farm Workers Union and its 
foundct~ Cesar Chavez, beginning in 1965. The UFW, 
which was locked in a battle for survival with California 
growers, was infiltrated by FBI agents, who generated 
field reports to discredit the organization and sought to 
link it with Mexican Communist organizations. The FBI 
shared information with the growers and purposefully 
failed to investigate the criminal actions of the growers 
against the union and its impoverished members. The ag-
gressive and extensive covert actions of the FBI and po-
lice authorities against dissident Chicano/a organizations 
severely weakened the vibrant Chicano/a Movement and 
made its dream or achieving social justice for this portion 
of the American population elusive. 
The FBI and Puerto Rican Independence and 
New Left Organizations 
The FBI has monitored the political activities of Puerto 
Rican communities in New York and Chicago, ever-vigi-
lant to possible links between independence organiza-
tions in Puerto Rico and their sympathizers in the United 
States. After the 1954 Nationalist Party attack on the U.S. 
House of Representatives, 250 FBI agents arrested 91 Na-
tionalists in New York. The San Juan FBI office was or-
dered in 1960 to "exchange ideas relative to tactics and 
techniques" with the New York bureau "because of the 
large number of Puerto Ricans residing in New York" and 
"the fact that" independence organizations were active in 
the cit~ (Churchill and Wall, p. 71). COINTELPRO tar-
geted the Young Lords and effectively infiltrated the or-
ganization and destroyed it by promoting irreconcilable 
factionalism. The Young Lords member Iris Morales 
wrote: "Police agents within the organization worked to 
intensifv the differences and natural contradictions that 
existed among us. Intimidation tactics and beatings si-
lenced opposition." In Chicago, FBI agents blocked and 
destabilized alliances that were developing between the 
Black Panther Party and the Young Lords. The Chicago 
COINTELPRO agent monitored the emerging coalition 
between the Panthers and the Lords and "would submit 
appropriate counterintelligence suggestions" (Wolf). 
Although the FBI had been involved in Puerto Rico since 
at least I 936, when it investigated the Nationalist Party, in 
1960 Hoover expressed alam1 that a resurgent independ-
ence movement on the island would establish links with the 
socialist Cuban government. Speaking before the General 
Assembly of the United Nations on September 28, 1960, 
both Fidel Castro, president of Cuba, and Nikita 
Khrushchev, leader of the Soviet Union, condemned the 
United States for the "crime of colonialism" and listed 
Puerio Rico among the colonized nations of the world. The 
resurgence in the mid- to late 1950s of organizations com-
mitted to Puerto Rican independence was of particular con-
cern lo the FBI. Among the most prominent of these 
organizations, all built in the wake of the virtual eradica-
tion of the radical Nationalist Party, were the Puerto Rican 
Pro-Independence Movement (MPJ); the Federation of Pro-
Independence University Students (FUPI), a renewed mili-
tant Puerio Rican Socialist Pariy; and Acci6n Patriotica 
Unitaria. The FBI seemed convinced that these organi-
zations, which subscribed variously to socialist or Marxist-
Leninist philosophies and were avowedly critical of U.S. 
colonialism or were sympathetic to the Cuban socialist 
regime, would resurrect the militant Nationalist Party cam-
paign for Puerto Rican independence. 
It is in the context of the rapid consolidation of the 
Cuban Revolution, the growing internationalization of 
Puerto Rico's political status, and what Socialist Party pres-
ident Juan Mari Bras called the "dawn of new stmggle for 
independence" (Silen, p. 429) that the FBI began COIN-
TELPRO operations in Puetio Rico to wage an aggressive 
campaign to eviscerate and render ineffective these inde-
pendence organizations. In August 1960 Hoover authorized 
agents in Puerto Rico to underiake a clandestine campaign 
to "distupt the activities" of organizations seeking inde-
pendence "through other than lawful, peaceful means" and 
informed them that he was "not interested in mere harass-
ment" (Churchill and Wall, p. 68). Puerto Rico was a high 
priori tv arena for COINTELPRO operations. The FBI either 
worked closely or shared information with the Puerto 
Rican police (which had its own Intelligence Division), U.S. 
military intelligence, and the Central Intelligence Agency. 
Bv the end of 1962 the FBI expanded its covert action 
campaign to infiltrate and disrupt the operations of virtu-
ally all groups advocating independence, irrespective of 
whether they advocated peaceful means to achieve this 
goal. The MPI and FUPI, neither of which advocated the 
use of violence to attain independence, were the first or-
ganizations targeted by COINTELPRO operatives. In 1966 
Hoover testified that at least nine proindcpendence organ-
izations that were seen as a continuous problem for U.S. 
internal security "were under investigation" (Merrill-
Ramirez, p. 260). Mari Bras was a frequent target of ha-
rassment and persecution given his centrality to the 
independence cause and his international stature as an op-
ponent of U.S. colonialism. The COINTELPRO goal was lo 
destroy the independence organizations because their ac-
tions were drawing world attention to Puerto Rico's colo-
nial situation and in the process eroding the legitimacy of 
the U.S.-supported Popular Democratic Party that gov-
emed the island. 
The FBI planted informers and agent provocateurs in a 
number of organizations to create discord and confusion 
among independentistas. FBI operatives tried to discredit 
the movement by linking it with "Communist Cuba," hop-
ing that this would encourage defections. FBI operatives 
employed blatant tactics of intimidation and misused the 
police and judicial powers of the Puerto Rican govem-
ment. According to Ruben Berrios, president of the Puerto 
Rican Independence Party, COINTELPRO waged "a 
frontal attack on an entire movement and an entire set of 
ideals. It is virtually an act of war upon our people's will, 
determination and rights" (Churchill and Wall, p. 88). 
The FBI's long history of violating the civil rights of 
Puerto Ricans came to light in congressional testimony by 
Director Louis Freeh, who conceded that the agency had 
undertaken "egregious illegal action, maybe criminal ac-
tion .... Particularly in the 1960s, the FBI did operate a 
program that did tremendous destruction to many people" 
(Gonzalez). After the suspension of COINTELPRO, the FBI 
remained deeply involved in combating legitimate inde-
pendence organizations, which, despite evidence to the 
contrary, were portrayed as potentially violent revolution-
ary groups. Throughout the 1970s the independence move-
ment was subjected to a virtual campaign of terrorism that 
included bombings of Independence Party and Socialist 
Party headquarters. Mari Bras's son was murdered in 1976. 
Two young independentistas were murdered in Cerro Mar-
avilla in 1978, provoking a legislative inquiry and accusa-
tions that the FBI attempted to obstruct the investigations. 
According to the reporter and writer Alfred Lopez, during 
a fifteen-year period ( 1971 to 1986) over 170 attacks of var-
ious types committed against independence movement or-
ganizations were documented. The FBI and local police 
were singularly incapable of investigating the cases and ar-
resting any suspects. In December 1999 Puerto Rican gov-
ernor Pedro Rossello revealed that the Police Intelligence 
Division in a "corrupt practice" had compiled secret 
dossiers (carpet as) on scores of thousands of Puerto Ri-
cans, the vast majority of whom were independence sym-
pathizers. The FBI provided assistance and, reportedly, 
actual training to local police authorities on surveillance 
techniques and directed police agents in conducting these 
clandestine operations. 
A long-standing campaign of state-sponsored repression 
against proindependence organizations and the virtual 
criminalization of individuals sympathetic to independ-
ence help explain the dramatic decline in popular support 
for self-determination in Puerto Rico during the last half 
of the twentieth century. Proponents of Puerto Rican in-
dependence have paid a high price for their belief that 
their country is a colony. 
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See also Brown Berets; Chicano/a Movement; 
Gonzales, Rodolfo Corky; Mari Bras, Juan; Puerto Ri-
cans; and Young Lords Party. 
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PEDRO CABAN 
COLON, JESUS (1901-1974), writer. Jesus Colon was 
born into a working-class family in Cayey, Puerto Rico. At 
age sixteen he moved to New York, where he worked in a 
variety of jobs, including "washing dishes, working on the 
docks, or at the many odd jobs in innumerable factories 
and shops" (Colon 1993, p. 37). His wide range of jobs al-
lowed him to witness the exploitation and abuse suffered 
by lower-class and unskilled laborers. Although Colon fin-
ished high school in New York and attended two years of 
college, he was primarily a self-taught individual, a tireless 
reader, and a collector of books and other written mate-
rial, such as pamphlets, invitations, newsletters, leaflets, 
and periodical articles. He became increasingly aware of 
social, political, and economic issues as he ventured 
deeper into Anglo-American society. 
In 1923 Colon began to publish articles in several 
New York newspapers, such as Justicia, Gnifico, Pueblos 
